# Keeping Smart Cities Smart: Preempting Emerging Cyber Attacks in U.S. Cities





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# Introduction

The idea for researching current cyber security-related issues in cities originated during my previous research, hacking traffic control systems. As my knowledge grew regarding our connected infrastructure, I became increasingly concerned about the current security posture of the world's infrastructure. After an in-depth analysis and weighing the security challenges of new technology adoption in cities, I felt compelled to write this report. I also asked select Fellows from the Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology (ICIT) to contribute their expertise to this report as well.

The goal of this paper is to generate consciousness about current cyber security issues in cities in order to kick-start discussions and actions to improve their security.

During my 15 years in offensive cyber security, I have found and reported hundreds of security vulnerabilities to CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Teams) and to most major software vendors. I have created innovative offensive cyber security techniques, employing different technologies for various security areas.

My experience gives me a unique view of a cyber-attacker's perspective when targeting a city. It allows me to better assess current and future possible cyber threats and attack impacts.

It is important for decision makers, technology vendors, and the general public to understand and take action on the content of this report.

#### **Smarter Cities**

Cities have been incorporating new technologies for several years, but lately the rate of technology adoption has increased and cities around the world are becoming smarter. Newer technologies along with faster and easier connectivity allow cities to optimize resources, save money, and at the same time provide better services to its citizens.

Depending on the amount of new technology, some cities are smarter than other cities, but most cities around the world have implemented at least some technology. Others have implemented much more.


Maybe the city where you live is not described as smart, but it likely still uses some level of technology. Instead of being filled with smart, highly-integrated systems, it may just use a few simple technologies.

US cities like New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Washington DC, Seattle, and Miami are becoming smarter by the day, a trend seen around the world. We also can see this in Europe, in London, Barcelona, Amsterdam, Paris, Stockholm, and Berlin; in Asia-Pacific, in Singapore, Seoul, Tokyo, Sydney, Melbourne, and Hong Kong; in the Middle East, in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, and in the South American cities of Rio de Janeiro and Santiago.

The increasing intelligence of cities is a global, accelerating, and unstoppable phenomenon.

#### **Smart Cities Defined**





If you search for a definition of the term smart city, you will find many definitions. For this discussion, I am using the following:

"A city that uses technology to automate and improve city services, making citizens' lives better."

In the truly smart city of the future, everything will be connected and automated. While this is not yet a reality, many cities are committing big budgets to get smarter. For instance:

- Saudi Arabia is investing US \$70 billion into smarter cities
- In Dubai, 1000 government services will go smart in few years
- Barcelona is already ranked as the world's smartest city
- In South Africa, a \$7.4 billion smart city project just started

According to some estimates, by 2020 the potential market for smart cities could be more than \$1 trillion. Estimates that are more conservative place it at hundreds of billions of dollars, but regardless we can agree that vendors are seeing a great opportunity with smart cities and the buzz around it is growing.

#### How Does a City Become "Smarter"? What Technologies Are Used?

Main city services become smarter by deploying new technologies like:

- Smart traffic control: Traffic lights and signals that adapt based on volume and current traffic conditions. Real-time traffic patterns are detected and the information is used to coordinate and improve traffic flow, on city streets, highways, ramps, and so on.
- Smart parking: Citizens can use a parking application to find available parking slots and to review pricing, including pricing changes based on time of day, availability, location, etc.
- Smart street lighting: Managed centrally, streetlights can adapt to weather conditions, report problems, or be automated by time of day. Streetlights can even turn off and on based on the detection of moving cars and people.
- Smart public transportation: Real-time data informs citizens about schedules (bus, train, and subways), arrivals, and delays of buses, trains, and subways. Contactless payment systems enable citizens to easily pay, using a smart phone, smart card, or RFID enabled device. These systems greatly increase convenience and efficiency by decreasing payment based congestion and delays.
- Smart energy management: Smart grids deliver energy based on user demand. Smart
  meters optimize user utility by coordinating energy supply schedules with the smart
  grid at specific times for the lowest cost. The smart grid can even turn off your home's
  water heater during peak hours when electricity is more costly. Smart buildings use
  similar techniques to conserve energy and buy electricity when rates are low.
- Smart water management: Smart pipes measure water quality, detect leaks, distribute
  water, and detect problems. Similar techniques are used for gas and oil pipelines to
  regulate flow and prevent disasters.
- Smart waste management: Sensors in waste containers detect the volume of





- garbage, smell, and so on. Garbage collection can be better planned by skipping empty containers or making early stops at container emitting abhorrent odors.
- Security: Traffic and surveillance cameras, gunshot detection sensors, and other
  security devices provide real-time information on events and their locations within the
  city. People-counting technology, such as tracking of mobile phones or communication
  (such as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth), is used to determine the number of people in a given area
  like a street, park, or building.

Those technologies are backed up by others:

- **City management systems:** These systems help to automate different city administration tasks.
- M2M (Machine to Machine): In order to make a city smarter, you need devices (machines) talking to each other, machine-to-machine, making decisions automatically.
- **Sensors:** Used for everything, sensors (often wireless) continuously feed smart city systems with data. Sensors are a core part of a smarter city.
  - Weather: Sensors detect weather conditions and send out alerts.
  - Pollution level: Sensors detect and inform pollution levels in different parts of a city.
  - Seismic: Bridges and underground sensors detect damage to tunnels and infrastructure caused by earthquakes, aging, or other infrastructure problems.
  - Smell: For garbage, natural gas, and a variety of other situations, smell sensors detect trouble.
  - Flood: Sensors detect flood conditions.
  - Sound: Sound sensors can detect gunshots, alarms, activity, and so on.
- **Open Data:** Data is shared (sometimes real-time data) by governments so that people can develop applications, for instance the Transport for London open data project.
- **Mobile applications:** In a smart city ecosystem, we could say mobile apps foster interaction of citizens with the city. Citizens retrieve information from city systems, sensors, and so on via mobile apps and make decisions based on information.

## Living in a Smarter City

Let's say someone wakes up on a regular working day, takes a look at his smart phone or tablet, and starts to look at different mobile apps to choose the best alternative to go to work. He checks schedules and delays for trains, buses, and subways. He also checks for temperature, pollution level, and weather conditions. (This could be something simple like packing an umbrella or a jacket, or avoid going out because of pollution level.)

Sensors everywhere feed city systems and send data to mobile apps. Let us say that the person chooses to go by car since there was a delay in public transportation and/or it's a rainy day. On the way to work, he checks a mobile app for the best route to avoid traffic and checks another





app to select parking based on availability and pricing. Traffic flow is good because of smart traffic control systems that adjusttraffic lights based on current traffic conditions. Because of rainy weather, smart street lighting will leave streetlights on until there is more daylight. If rain causes floods, flood detection sensors will immediately alert city management and citizens too. City management closely monitors the entire city with the help of surveillance, sensors, and traffic cameras. The rain causes public transport delays, and relevant information is pushed out to mobile applications so that people can choose transport alternatives.

Let me stop there, since I think you get the picture. Smart technology is significantly changing life in metropolitan areas.

# **Cyber Security Problems**

Every new technology and innovation brings new challenges and problems. In this report, I am focusing on cyber-security related problems that currently affect or will affect smart and non-smart cities around the world. These problems impact the city government, the residents, and the businesses and other organizations that operate there.

Keeping in mind the new technologies and life in a smarter city, consider what could happen if one or more technology-reliant services fails to work. What would commuting look like with non-functioning traffic control systems, no streetlights, and no public transportation? How would citizens respond to an inadequate supply of electricity or water, or to dark streets, and no cameras? What if garbage collection is interrupted in the summertime and the smell of refuse stinks up the streets? I guess that it would be unpleasant and probably cause a lot of chaos in any city. When prolonged, interruptions to sanitation services, or other basic services, goes beyond unpleasant odors and inconvenience, it does not take long before these issues create major concerns for Public Health officials. The threat of natural resource contamination (air quality issues, ground water contamination, and pest harborage...etc.) and pestilence grows each passing day that sanitation services remain interrupted.

That scenario might not be as unlikely as you think. Numerous cyber-security events could trigger such an occurrence, such as:

- Poor or Nonexistent Security
- Lack of Cyber Security Testing
- Encryption Issues
- Lack of Computer Emergency Response Teams
- Large and Complex Attack Surfaces
- Patch Deployment Issues
- Insecure Legacy Systems
- Simple Bugs with Huge Impact
- Public Sector Issues
- Lack of Cyber Attack Emergency Plans





- Susceptibility to Denial of Service
- Technology Vendors Who Impede Security Research
- Proliferation of "Smart" Devices or The Internet of Things

## **Lack of Cyber Security Testing**

Sadly, cities are implementing new technologies without first testing cyber security. In fact, as I have proven in my latest research, this is happening in most countries. I learned that about 200,000 vulnerable traffic control sensors were installed in Washington DC, New York, Seattle, San Francisco, London, Lyon, Melbourne, and other important cities around the world.

In our research at IOActive Labs, we constantly find very vulnerable technology being used across different industries. This same technology also is used for critical infrastructure without any security testing. Although cities usually rigorously test devices and systems for functionality, resistance to weather conditions, and so on, there is often little or no cyber security testing at all. This is concerning to say the least because lack of proper testing before implementation transfers the risk and consequence of failed or breached technology, to citizens without their knowledge or permission.

## **Poor or Nonexistent Security**

Vendors claim to have obscure, nonexistent security features, with no documentation, which is only described in a sales pitch. At IOActive Labs, we continue to see vendors with little or no experience in implementing security features. They lack skilled security personnel and they do not properly invest in improving security. For instance, many vendors do not object to giving full privileged access to a device or system to anyone who is on a local network, because they think of the internal network as safe. However, if an attacker accesses the network, he can easily fully compromise available devices and systems. It may sound incredible but exceptionally poor security practices are common on industrial systems and devices on the Internet of Things (IoT). These practices are being propagated into city technology.

# **Encryption Issues**

Most new devices are wireless (such as traffic and surveillance cameras, smart meters, street lights, traffic lights, smart pipes, sensors, and so on), which makes them easy to implement but also easier to hack if communication is not properly encrypted.

Wired communication requires physical access which generally makes it more difficult to hack, but some systems that rely on wired communication are more exposed and easier to access, such as Power-line Communication (PLC) technologies. An attackersimply connects to electric power to get access to the network. Some smart grid and street lighting solutions use this technology.

Many vendors implement custom wireless and wired communication protocols with either very poor security or no security. Even when encryption is implemented at wireless and wired communications, very few vendors properly implement encryption.





Some vendors implement outdated and weak encryption algorithms, while others implement known good standard encryption but still have weak encryption key management. Most common encryption problems are related to poor key generation, fixed keys, shared keys, leaked keys, and so on. Once an encryption key is compromised, attackers get full access to communications.

Sometimes encryption options are available to secure communications but cities simply do not turn them on. This is something common that usually happens because people without security knowledge deploy the systems or due to the complexity to implement proper encryption.

When either wireless or wired communications security is poor, an attacker can easily intercept and hijack communications and take control of devices and networks. Afterward, the actor can access restricted data or systems, compromise additional infrastructure, or impregnate the network with malicious code and backdoor access.

# **Lack of City Computer Emergency Response Teams**

Another important issue is the lack of specific CERTs for cities and states.

Existing CERTs already have problems with coordination and communication. For instance, for the latest important research at IOActive Labs, we provided detailed information to CERTs but we often still received calls and emails from the military, federal agencies, and others asking for this information. We do not know why the military and federal agencies do not receive such important information on time, but ICIT is actively engaged with the legislative community as it works on information sharing legislation aimed at improving agency-to-agency threat information sharing.

# **Large and Complex Attack Surfaces**

Smarter cities have a larger and less discernable attack surface. With so much complexity and interdependency, it is difficult to know what and how everything is exposed.

Therefore, simple problems could cause a big impact due to interdependency and chain reactions. Threat modeling is critical for cities to mitigate cascading impacts. We will see an example of this later.

Has anyone seen a threat model for a city? Due to the novelty of the internet of things and the tantalizing positive externalities offered by smart systems, little focus has been given to threat modelling at the city level. Some larger software and services vendors have issued general documents about cyber security in cities but nothing very specific has been offered.

# **Patch Deployment Issues**

Patch deployment and system updates face many security problems. Because of complexity, patches are difficult and costly to test on non-production systems, since some production systems are costly to reproduce. It is increasingly common for cities to use vulnerable devices and systems because vendors are slow to release patches or patches are not available. According to author David Rice, it is economically optimal for software companies to release faulty products and to delay patching a system until a breach has occurred, even if the vulnerability is known during





development. This affords software companies the ability to race products to market at the lowest operational costs. Risk and any impact of a breach is transferred to the city and citizens who the breach affects. In this way, users are utilized as crash test dummies for insecure software until enough public sentiment or governing oversight demands a patch.

For vulnerabilities discovered in my previous research, the vendor took a year to release a patch, and we still do not know if it really fixed the vulnerabilities. Even if it worked, devices are still vulnerable if the patch was not applied worldwide, or if the patch creates additional vulnerabilities. For illustration, think of a system as an egg, a vulnerability as a crack in the egg, and your finger as the patch. Placing your finger over the crack may protect the "internal network" from interaction with the outside world, or it may brace that interface by generating a subsequent series of surrounding cracks.

# **Insecure Legacy Systems**

New technology is being integrated with old technology that may be vulnerable. Some old technologies that lack standards can require a piece of technology in the middle to bridge old and new systems and to translate protocols. Some systems will not run on newer, more secure operating systems; therefore, vulnerable and older operating systems are used. This adds complexity, increases the attack surface, and makes for slow adoption of new technologies.

I was quite surprised when I saw a CNN story on the Burj Khalifa smart building, the world's tallest and smarter building. Main building systems are run on the Windows XP operating system, which is old, outdated, not supported and less secure than new operating systems. This makes Burj Khalifa an easy target for possible cyber-attacks.

# Simple Bugs with Huge Impact

When you have a city that is running hundreds of systems and devices for critical services, a simple software bug can have huge impact. Let us consider some real examples to better illustrate this:

#### May 3, 2012

A tie-up on Interstate 80 was caused by a computer glitch. The Placer County court accidentally summoned 1,200 people to jury duty on the same morning. Taking their duty seriously, residents tried to be on time at 8:00 a.m. and were in a line of traffic with other would-be jurors, causing the traffic jam.

#### Nov 22, 2013

San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) was shut down. Due to a major software glitch earlier in the morning, service was shut down by a technical problem involving track switching, which began shortly after midnight and affected 19 trains with about 500 to 1,000 passengers on board. Passengers were trapped on trains in the late evening and early morning hours.





#### August 14, 2003

A blackout affected an estimated 10 million people in Ontario and 45 million people in eight US states. The blackout's primary cause was a software bug in the alarm system at a control room of the FirstEnergy Corporation, located remotely in Ohio. A lack of alarms left operators unaware of the need to redistribute power after overloaded transmission lines hit unpruned foliage. This triggered a software bug known as a race condition in the control software.

The race condition existed in General Electric Energy's Unix-based XA/21 energy management system. Once triggered, the bug stalled FirstEnergy's control room alarm system for over an hour. System operators were unaware of the malfunction; the failure deprived them of both audio and visual alerts for important changes in system state. What would have been a manageable local blackout cascaded into widespread distress across the electric grid.

Some information about the blackout impact:

- 508 generating units at 265 power plants were shut down
- Water systems in several cities lost pressure
- At least 10 deaths were reported
- New York City had 3,000 fires calls
- The New York City 311 information hotline received over 75,000 calls
- Mobile networks overloaded and were disrupted
- Hundreds of flights were cancelled
- New York State was responsible for billions of dollars in costs

These simple software bugs had a big impact, and there are many more examples. Imagine what could happen if an attacker could trigger bugs like these at will.

#### **Public Sector Issues**

Another problem with city cyber security is government bureaucracy. When dealing with security issues, there is no time to lose. On top of time pressures, cities have a shortage of workers with security skills. Cities have inadequate budgets, training, and resources to help workers develop skills, and this can make the problem worse. Furthermore, cities often view infrastructure and cyber security as an afterthought in the budget; as a result, salaries are often significantly lower than private sector or federal positions and cities often fail to recruit skilled security talent.

# **Lack of Cyber Attack Emergency Plans**

Cities should be required to seriously consider how to best prepare against possible cyber-attacks. Cities need to develop an emergency plan that provides steps to follow during a cyber-attack and educate people on how to react while under attack. Fast and effective reaction can be key to preventing bigger problems including city chaos. Training ensures that decisions made under pressure result from the approved security plan rather than rash judgement. Furthermore,





Emergency plans account for personnel and resource deployment in the event that smart city infrastructure fails. As a result, a natural disaster or dedicated attack does not devastate the city because contingency plans enable action in the moment of crisis.

## Susceptibility to Denial of Service

With so many services dependent on technology in a city, attackers have many methods to abuse them and cause Denial of Service (DoS). The cause of DoS could be something simple; for instance, a DoS attack could interrupt of an Internet-facing server that feeds data to a couple of systems; this would have a big impact on regular city services and activities. For instance, in mid-2007, the country of Estonia, known for its advanced cyber infrastructure, was the target of a two-week long Dedicated Denial of Service attack (DDos) that crippled critical services of citizens and businesses alike. One Estonian official stated, "we are back in the stone age..."

## **Technology Vendors Impede Security Research**

Finally, the security research community is anxious to test more technologies used by cities, but these devices and systems are difficult to acquire. They are expensive, and they are only sold to governments or to specific companies or people. This makes life easier for some vendors since they can continue to release unsecured products without accountability from researchers.

The public needs to see to believe. Cities are not spurred to action by discussions about suspected vulnerable products and threats on cities. Without clearly seeing or directly experiencing problem, the public does not generally care. People need to see me and other ethical researchers hacking traffic lights, smart grids, and so on in order to understand that the threat is real, and not just theoretical. From a legislative and regulatory perspective, it is equally as important that institutes like ICIT educate federal and state policymakers on the risks facing cities and their citizens if these practices continue.

# Proliferation of "Smart" Devices or the Internet of Things.

As more and more devices are developed with the ability to connect to networks and leverage internet connectivity, it is not unimaginable that the next intrusion into a "secured" Citywide system will come through the connected coffee machine in the break room or through the smart board in the conference room. The sheer volume of devices entering the enterprise space makes monitoring, configuring, and patching of these devices a herculean task. Devices ship with a generic ID and default password/PIN making them easy targets for even a fledgling hacker with modest tools available online for free. Given that, the service life of some of these appliances measures in decades it would not be out of the realm of possibility to think that they may last longer than some of the companies who manufacture them. Who then supports these devices that are connected to public/government networks 10, 15, or 25 years from now? Little thought is being given this far in advance for devices that the average person gives no thought to on a daily basis. This is just the tip of the iceberg considering that some cities may see tens of thousands of "smart" devices enter their Enterprise quickly over the next few years. Strategies must be developed now to address these concerns before they become all too commonplace threats.





# **Cyber Attacks on Cities**

All technologies used by cities plus all the associated cyber security problems that were previously described open the door for several possible cyber-attacks. Each new city technology or system creates a new opportunity for cyber attackers.

Let's discuss in depth some of the key technologies and systems that together make up the smart city's complex attack surface:

- Traffic Control Systems
- Smart Street Lighting
- City Management Systems
- Sensors
- Public Data
- Mobile Applications
- Cloud and SaaS Solutions
- Smart Grid
- Public Transportation
- Cameras
- Social Media
- Location-based Services
- Public Safety systems

# **Traffic Control Systems**

Last year, a research team from University of Michigan and I independently proved that traffic control systems could be easily hacked. The University of Michigan research found that some Econolite devices were used without any encryption for communication between traffic control systems and traffic lights, traffic controllers, and so on, allowing an attacker to directly change traffic lights. More than 100,000 intersections in the US and Canada could be affected.

In my research, I found that Sensys Networks devices didn't have any encryption, any authentication, or any security at all. It was possible to feed traffic control systems with fake data making them accept incorrect options when setting configuration and timing on traffic lights, ramp meters, traffic signals, and so on. It was possible to fully compromise the sensors and even to create a firmware update worm. More than 200,000 vulnerable sensors deployed worldwide were affected.

We still do not know if these vulnerabilities were patched. If they were, we do not know how the patch addressed the vulnerability and whether the patches actually were applied. Cities cannot easily detect if someone did something malicious like updating firmware with backdoors. I had an interesting discussion with someone from the US Department of





Transportation (US DOT), who was not worried about these vulnerabilities since he said, "we have worse things to worry about." I could not fight that argument but it shocked me to know that US cities are vulnerable to worse attacks on traffic control systems that the one I discovered.

# **Smart Street Lighting**

Wireless street lighting systems are being deployed in many cities around the world. <sup>29</sup> Most systems use wireless communications and have the encryption related problems previously described. Attacks on smart street lighting systems are not complex and can have big impact by causing street blackouts in large areas. For example, there exists a scenario where a street blackout could affect an entire island in the US Virgin Islands where a wireless street lighting system was implemented.

I have tried to get my hands on the specific devices used in the US Virgin Islands, resulting in about a dozen calls and emails with the vendor, who promised to send me a quote for the devices but did not send it. Why is it to hard to acquire such equipment? Why would the vendor not sell it to IOActive?

There are also wired solutions using Power-line Communication (PLC) technologies that also could have the encryption problems that were already mentioned.

# **City Management Systems**

Every city has hundreds of systems to manage different services and tasks. Hacking these systems would give an attacker many options to cause harm. Just as simple software bugs can create significant harm, manipulating simple information could also have a seemingly oversized security effect.

Imagine if an attacker can intentionally trigger those bugs and with some planning, get an even bigger impact. For instance, an attacker could manipulate map information and work orders to send city or contractor workers to dig a hole over gas or water pipes or communication cables, with the intention to damage those facilities. After all, this has already happened in the past by mistake several times.

On June 7, 2010, a 36-inch gas pipeline explosion and fire in Johnson County, Texas, was caused by workers installing poles for electrical lines. One worker was killed, and eight were injured. Due to confusion about the location and status of the construction work, the pipeline was not marked beforehand.

One of the largest targets in any organization is its internal messaging and communications systems. Communications systems for Cities are no exception. There is a reason why email scams and social media attacks are so prevalent; they're effective. Misinformation is not the only way to cripple a system. Bombarding a system to its breaking point or flooding it with infected traffic will eventually take its toll and systems are taken offline to stem the damage being done. A lack of information and/or the ability to communicate in a time of crisis is most likely more damaging than misinformation. Depriving organizations of the ability to coordinate resources in a time of need can lead to catastrophe.





#### Sensors

Smart city systems rely heavily on sensor data to make decisions and take action. Most sensors use wireless technologies that are affected by the types of security problems already mentioned. Attacks that involve compromising sensors and sending fake data can directly affect systems since decisions and actions will be based on fake data. This could have great impact depending on how the affected systems use the data and interact with other systems.

Attackers could even fake an earthquake, tunnel, or bridge breakage, flood, gun shooting, and so on, raising alarms and causing general panic. An attacker could launch a nuisance attack by faking data from smell or rubbish level sensors in empty garbage containers, to make garbage collectors waste time and resources.

Keep in mind that many systems and services from cities rely on sensors, including smart waste and water management, smart parking, traffic control, and public transport.

Hacking wireless sensors is an easy way to remotely launch cyber-attacks over a city's critical infrastructure.

### **Public Data**

Public data (open data) is available to attackers, sometimes in real time. This data can help them determine the best timing for attacks, schedule attacks, create attack triggers, coordinate attacks, and so on. Attackers do not need to act blindly; they can act precisely, relying on real data. For instance, attackers can identify exactly when a bus or train is arriving. They can see when traffic is heaviest, when more people are gathering at a location, and so on.

In addition, information about the technologies in use in cities is often available since governments have public lists of technology providers and contracts. Sometimes vendors will highlight case studies for cities that have been deployed.

All of this gives attackers a lot of detailed information to misuse.

# **Mobile Applications**

Mobile applications are affected by common security vulnerabilities which could allow attackers to perform a variety of attacks, from simple Man in The Middle (MiTM) attacks to more complex attacks. Attackers could also target mobile application development companies or just target the data that feeds the applications. Mobile applications are an important target since cities' citizens will make decisions and act based on information from those apps. Hacking mobile apps has direct impact on citizens' behavior. For instance, if the public transport app is showing a delay on a bus, a citizen could choose to travel to work by car; if hundreds of people in high-density area make the same decision, the result is a traffic jam, which we can think of as a city DoS.

#### **Cloud and SaaS Solutions**

City servers and cloud infrastructure are exposed to common Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) attacks. Severs and cloud infrastructure are cheaper targets for cybercriminals or cyber





terrorists. Significant disruption to city services and lasting harm to citizens could occur if sensitive data is stored on cloud servers and made unavailable due to a dedicated attack. In the event of such an attack, city government, not the service provider, would retain ownership of the risk and citizens would feel the consequences. The service provider would likely be protected by a service level agreement (SLA) and some degree of insurance. Additionally, when in use, Software as a Service (SaaS) could allow attackers to hack a single service provider and then launch attacks against many cities at same time. Cities should consider the security implications of SaaS solutions as well as their functionality.

#### **Smart Grid**

Energy is the lifeline of a city; without energy, there is no smart city. Last year, researchers Alberto Garcia Illera and Javier Vazquez Vidal at Black Hat Europe demonstrated it was possible to black out big city areas by manipulating smart meters exploiting encryption problems in Power-line Communication (PLC) technologies. This is not new; years ago Mike Davis of IOActive created the first proof-of-concept worm for the smart grid.

Attacks on a smart grid could be devastating, causing millions of dollars in losses and even loss of life.

## **Public Transportation**

Citizens use public transportation information systems daily to know what time some transport is scheduled to arrive or depart whether to expect delays, etc. By just by displaying incorrect information by manipulating public transportation information systems, it is possible to influence people's behavior to cause delays, overcrowding, and so on. For instance, by faking a delay in a subway line, attackers can influence people to move to another line, overcrowding it.

In addition, an attacker could target payment systems. If payment systems do not work, people might ride free or thousands of people could jam customer service counters and hotlines with complaints.

#### **Cameras**

Cameras are becoming more widely used in most cities around the world. Traffic and surveillance cameras are the eyes of the city and by attacking them attackers can make cities blind. Our research has shown that DoS attacks on these devices are not difficult and that these attacks are very effective. It is not always possible to remotely restart cameras. In addition, DoS attacks can be made persistent by modifying firmware or exploiting vulnerabilities.

Usually cities deploy hundreds of cameras of the same brand and model. This makes attacks easier since any vulnerability will affect all cameras in the city.

Some of these cameras are wireless and suffer from the problems already described for wireless communications such as no encryption, weak encryption, and so on.

Recently Kaspersky Labs researcher, Vasilis Hiuorios, found that police surveillance cameras were vulnerable and easy to hack.





#### **Social Media**

Social media can be used as an amplification platform for attacks. We saw this in recent high-profile company hacks. For instance, attackers can increase the impact of an attack by causing panic in a population. If just one simple attack is real, then a bigger attack can be promoted. Even if promoted attack never happens, it will scare people. Every day that such a problem persists, it will grow and incite increasingly angry citizens. Attackers know this and can play with social media perceptions at will. In "Geekonomics: The Real Cost of Insecure Software", author David Rice explains that numerous small, seemingly insignificant attacks can be more detrimental than large attacks because the prevalent minor events create the illusion of disorder and transfer of control to the attackers. In an extension of the theory of broken windows, once one minor attack succeeds, and the cascading failures of dependent systems resolve, attackers are more likely to attack again or inspire other actors to attack the system. Once attention is called to the prevalent minor attacks, the ensuing panic can be much greater and longer lasting than that of single major breach.

#### **Location-based Services**

Many services are location-based, which means GPS spoofing and other attacks are possible. People get real-time location information, and if the location is wrong, then people will make decisions based on incorrect information. The nature of the impact depends on the extent to which a city relies on the services affected. Worse, if an attacker breaches a system containing stored user location information or can view user devices connected to the network, then malicious actors can target specific users for harm, target specific users for espionage purposes, or garner a degree of useful information based on locations visited. For instance, it is not difficult to wager that two businesses are merging if an actor can verify that members of each board are meeting regularly. Police officers and other city officials, whose vehicles or work phones, utilize constant location based information, are at particularly high risk of targeted attacks.

# **Public Safety Systems**

There is an ever-increasing reliance on technology when providing support for Public Safety services to the general public. 9-1-1 Emergency Call handling, Police/Fire/EMS dispatching services, Citizen online non-emergency reporting, and a myriad of other services all rely on a combination of technologies working seamlessly in concert to provide high-demand Public Safety services. A failure at any single point in the chain of these systems could prove catastrophic and result in a loss of life to either first-responders or the public they serve. When dealing with physical security and safety of the public the focus does not shift to cyber-security many times until it is too late and systems have been compromised. While some agencies take a proactive posture when it comes to cybersecurity, many are still in a reactive mindset until it is too late. These same agencies are often between a rock and a hard place when considering the funding for cyber initiatives. In an environment of shrinking budgets and increasing demands for information based services tough decisions have to be made and often times the decision goes to physical assets (hiring more police and firefighters, police cars, body armor, ambulances, and medical equipment...etc.) versus technological assets. In this environment it becomes easy to





also understand that the training and hiring for cybersecurity personnel is also behind when compared to that of their public-facing first response counterparts.

Reliance on outdated technologies, operating systems, and public transparency makes Public Safety systems an appealing target. A continued reliance on technologies like Bluetooth and older AVL (Automatic Vehicle Locator) systems with known vulnerabilities puts Public Safety systems at risk. Those who are dedicated to penetrating these systems look for the path of least resistance like the holes left open by the use of these technologies. As they stand today, these systems make tantalizing targets to those who would attack them.

## Municipal Wireless Networks

Over 57 major cities in the world offer some degree of free citywide internet connection over a municipal wireless (muni- wi-fi) network. While such networks attract tourists and lower the costs to consumers living in the target area, the networks also pose complicated risks. Muni Wi-fi networks offer free internet access to unknown users, so typical encryption and authentication practices inhibit their function. As a result, the networks are left unprotected and easily abused by attackers. Cities can limit the harm done by attackers by monitoring traffic, warning users of the risk, and not connecting the network to any city systems.

### **Insider Threats**

Smart cities must employ more rigorous hiring processes for any cyber-security or non-cyber-security personnel who could digitally or physically harm critical systems. Hiring and firing procedures for system administrators and janitors alike must mitigate potential harm the employee could cause by restricting access and monitoring the employee. New hires should be thoroughly screened and paid competitive salaries. Terminated employees should lose any physical or digital access to city infrastructure. Employees should be monitored proactively for aberrant behavioral trends to preempt negative results. Insider threats are often unexpected. For example, in July 2008, San Francisco Network Administrator, Terry Childs, seized control of city systems by altering the city administrator password and preventing any access to cyber-infrastructure. Supervisors had disciplined Childs, an employee of five years, and he held the city systems for ransom for 12 days as a result. This resulted in at least \$900,000 in costs to the city San Francisco. Imagine how high the monetary and intangible costs of such an incident could be in a fully integrated smart city.

# **Threats and Skilled Attackers**

New war scenarios make cities technologies an important and interesting target. Cyber war attacks will target city services and infrastructure.

Terrorism has evolved in the digital age significantly faster than the adoption of the technology and best practices to detect breaches in reasonable time and mitigate the risk. Cities are constantly at risk for cyber terrorism from lone actors or nation state sponsored attacks. People with university degrees are joining extremist groups. They are skilled and can use new technologies to launch terrorist attacks.





Nation states are already targeting companies and governments around the world for espionage, cyber-attacks, and so on. Nation states have the knowledge and skillsto easily attack cities and cause significant damage.

Hacktivists groups are known for launching cyber-attacks campaigns on companies, organizations, groups of people, governments, and so on. These attacks could target city technologies too as part of a cyber-attack campaign on a country or specific geographic area.

Billions of dollars are annually lost worldwide because of cybercrime. Cybercriminals are well organized and have plenty of resources. Their attack techniques and malware continuously evolve. Moreover, given the ubiquity of emergent technology and the formation of online underground communities, cyber-crime is becoming cheaper and easier to commit. "Prepackaged" exploit kits can be downloaded to grant an attacker, with only basic technical knowledge, the ability to breach a vulnerable system. Zero day exploits, unpatched software vulnerabilities present as a fault of the manufacturer upon release, can remain undetected for some time. Now, these exploits can be purchased online and used by a plethora of malicious actors, rather than discovered and abused by an individual actor.

City technology is vulnerable because almost everything in a city is or will soon be running software inside. For instance, cybercriminals could find a good business opportunity by charging cities a ransom to regain control of compromised systems and infrastructure. Their message could be: "Do you want the smart grid back? Then pay us \$100 million in bitcoins." Examples of similar events occurring through the use of the CryptoLocker Ransomware virus are already well known, both to Public and Private Enterprises. With infections usually occurring through the use of social media and streaming media sites it is easy to see how access management and strict controls plays a major role in how these systems should be secured. Essentially, critical systems or files are encrypted by the actor with strong encryption and are made unavailable to the user until either the ransom is paid or authorities break the encryption and the target is recovered. Ransoms are generally high and whether the paid attacker actually releases the system is dubious. Typically, released systems or data can no longer be trusted or relied upon because neither the confidentiality nor the integrity of the data can be assured. In either case, dire consequences may result from the days of disrupted service while authorities "negotiate" with their attackers or try to free the data of their own volition.

# Recommendations

The following are just basic, general recommendations to reduce problems. Much work is needed, but cities can get started using these steps that can make a big difference in the current situation:

- Make funding for Cybersecurity personnel a priority rather than an afterthought. As
  cities become more connected and smart these people will be the gatekeepers for
  protecting data and public technology assets.
- Adopt or create a Cybersecurity framework and adhere to it. Explicit policies should
  cover everything from the selection of systems, procurement of systems, management
  of systems, and who accesses systems to the manner in which technology is disposed
  of securely once it has reached the end of its service life.
- Enable features and connectivity on systems only as necessary rather than as common practice.





- Create Cybersecurity awareness and education programs for internal users and the
  public alike. Eliminate a significant portion of the insider threat by eliminating
  ignorance of the problems being faced.
- Create a simple checklist-type cyber security review. Check for proper encryption, authentication, and authorization and make sure the systems can be easily updated.
- Ask all vendors to provide all security documentation. Make sure Service Level
  Agreements include on-time patching of vulnerabilities and 24/7 response in case of
  incidents.
- Proactively monitor networks for unusual traffic, access logs, or requests that could indicate an attack in progress.
- Fix security issues as soon as they are discovered. A city can continuously be under attack if issues are not fixed as soon as possible. For instance, if a traffic control system is hacked and not quickly fixed, it will continue being hacked over and over again and turn the city into chaos.
- Create specific city CERTs that can deal with cyber security incidents, vulnerability reporting and patching, coordination, information sharing, and so on.
- Perform quarterly/annual Cyber Event exercises to test the readiness and reliability of response plans and employee/citizen education efforts. Train personnel to react to crisis with and without access to cyber-resources.
- Liaise with other cities/organizations of similar size and scope to discuss how they are handling Cyber events. Information is key and information sharing is a vital part of combatting real and persistent cyber threats.
- Implement and make known to city workers secondary services/procedures in case of cyber attacks, and define formal communication channels.
- Implement fail safe and manual overrides on all system services. Do not depend solely on the smart technology.
- Restrict access in some way to public data. Request registration and approval for using public data, and track and monitor access and usage.
- Regularly run penetration tests on all city systems and networks.
- Implement redundant/ backup versions of critical systems. Update and secure redundant/ backup systems to the same degree as primary systems.
- Finally, prepare for the worst and create a threat model for every conceivable scenario.

# **Conclusion**

The current attack surface for cities is unimaginably vast open to attack. This is a real and immediate danger. The more technology a city uses, the greater it is vulnerability to cyberattacks; so, the smartest cities have the highest risks.

It is only a matter of time until attacks on city services and infrastructure happen. It may be ongoing or could happen at any moment in the future.





Actions must be taken now to make cities more secure and protect against cyber-attacks.

It is paramount that the technologies used by cities must be properly security audited to make certain that they are secure before they are implemented. Failure to do so is reckless and subjects every citizen to undue risk.

Smart Cities become Dumb Cities when incoming data is blindly trusted, attackers easily manipulate data, systems are easily compromised, and security problems are prevalent.

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Cesar Cerrudo is Chief Technology Officer for IOActive Labs, where he leads the team in producing ongoing, cutting-edge research in areas including Industrial Control Systems/SCADA, smart cities, the Internet of Things, and software and mobile device security. Cesar is a world-renowned security researcher and specialist in application security. Cesar is also a Fellow at the Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology (ICIT), serving as one of the Institutes experts in cybersecurity, Internet of Things, and smart cities.

Throughout his career, Cesar is credited with discovering and helping to eliminate dozens of vulnerabilities in leading applications including Microsoft SQL Server, Oracle database server, IBM DB2, Microsoft Windows, Yahoo! Messenger, and Twitter, to name a few. He has a record of finding more than 50 vulnerabilities in Microsoft products including 20 in Microsoft Windows operating systems. Based on his unique research, Cesar has authored white papers on database and application security as well as attacks and exploitation techniques. He has presented at a variety of company events and conferences around the world including Microsoft, Black Hat, Bellua, CanSecWest, EuSecWest, WebSec, HITB, Microsoft BlueHat, EkoParty, FRHACK, H2HC, Infiltrate, 8.8, Hackito Ergo Sum, NcN, Segurinfo, and DEF CON.

Cesar collaborates with and is regularly quoted in print and online publications. His research has been covered by Wired, Bloomberg Businessweek, TIME, The Guardian, CNN, NBC, BBC, Fox News, and so on.

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Hacking, security, smart cities, cyber cities, cities, cyber terrorism, cyber attacks, cyberwar, cyber criminal



